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Data Warehouses manage historical information for the decision making process, and this
information could be discovered by unauthorized users if security constraints are not established.
It is therefore highly important for OLAP tools to consider the security rules defined at early stages
of the development lifecycle. By following the MDA approach we have created an architecture with
which to develop secure Data Warehouses, and in this paper we complete this architecture, thus
obtaining secure multidimensional code in SQL Server Analysis Services from our secure
multidimensional conceptual model (SECDW) by using QVT transformations. We focus on
automatically obtaining code for the security constraints defined at upper abstraction levels. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Multidimensional modelling is the foundation of Data Warehouses (DWs), multidimensional (MD)
Databases and On-Line Analytical Processing Applications (OLAP). Data Warehouse systems are
used by decision makers to analyze the status and the development of an organization (Kimball,
2002), based on large amounts of data integrated from heterogeneous sources into a multi -
dimensional (MD) model. 
Information security is, furthermore, a serious requirement that must be carefully taken into
account, not as an isolated aspect, but as an element present in all stages of the development
lifecycle: from requirement analysis to implementation and maintenance (Devanbu and
Stubblebine, 2000; Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2006). Information assurance, security and privacy
have thus moved from being considered by information systems designers as narrow topics of
interest to becoming critical issues of fundamental importance in our society (Denker et al, 2005).
Some authors indicate that the survival of organizations depends on the correct management of
information security and confidentiality (Dhillon, 2001). Data Warehouses use enterprise
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information for the decision making process and a user may be able to discover extremely important
information by using queries in OLAP tools. It is therefore necessary for the security measures
defined in early stages of the development process to be applied in OLAP. 
In addition, OMG Model Driven Architecture, MDA (OMG, 2003) is a standard for model-
driven approaches for software development that is based on the separation between the
specification of the system functionality and its implementation using specific platforms. MDA
defines a Platform-Independent Model (PIM) which does not include information about specific
platforms and technologies. This model (PIM) can be translated into: (1) one or more Platform-
Specific Models (PSM) with information about the specific technology used; or (2) other PIMs with
a different level of abstraction. Each PSM can then be translated into a code that can be executed in
the specific platform. Several proposals for defining these translations between models exist
(Czarnecki and Helsen, 2003), and OMG proposes the use of Query/Views/Transformations, QVT
(OMG, 2005) to define transformations between models created by using Meta-Object Facility
(MOF, 2006). 
In Fernández-Medina et al (2007a) a proposal for modelling secure Data Warehouses using a
MDA approach is presented, which will be described in the following section. This proposal does
not deal with the final implementation in OLAP tools, but in Blanco et al (2008) it is discussed how
security measures defined by using this approach could eventually be implemented in OLAP tools.
In this paper, the authors focus on automatically obtaining secure multidimensional code for SQL
Server Analysis Services by following the MDA approach. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will present related work; Section
3 will describe our MDA approach for developing secure DWs; Section 4 will present our QVT
transformations with which to obtain secure multidimensional code; Section 5 will show an
example of the application of the defined transformations and Section 6 will present our conclusions
and future work. Code for the proposed rules will be presented in greater detail in the Appendices. 
2. RELATED WORK 
OLAP systems are mechanisms with which to discover business information and use a
multidimensional analysis of data to make strategic decisions. This information is organized
according to the business parameters, and users may be able to discover unauthorized data by
applying a set of OLAP operations to the multidimensional view. Therefore, it is of vital importance
for organizations to protect their data from unauthorized accesses. Several works attempting to
include security issues in OLAP tools by implementing the previously defined security rules at a
conceptual level have been proposed, but these works focus solely upon the Discretional Access
Control (DAC) policy and use a simplified role concept implemented as a subject. For instance,
Katic et al (1998) proposed a DW security model based on metamodels which provides us with
views for each user group and uses DAC with classification and access rules for security objects
and subjects. However, this model does not allow us to define complex confidentiality constraints.
Kirkgoze et al (1997) defined a role-based security concept for OLAP by using a “constraints list”
for each role, and this concept is implemented through the use of a discretional system in which
roles are defined as subjects. 
Priebe and Pernul (2001) later proposed a security design methodology, analyzed security
requirements, classifying them into basic and advanced, and dealt with their implementation in
commercial tools. In Priebe and Pernul (2001) the same authors used ADAPTed UML to define a
DAC system with roles defined as subjects at a conceptual level. They then went on to implement
this in SQL Server Analysis Services 2000 by using Multidimensional Expressions (MDX). They
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created a Multidimensional Security Constraint Language (MDSCL) based on MDX and put
forward HIDE statements with which to represent negative authorization constraints on certain
multidimensional elements: cube, measure, slice and level. 
On the other hand, Model Driven Development when applied to the development of secure
information systems permits us to build robust secure information systems in which security is not
improvised and incorporated once the system has been completely built. In this context, security
models are embedded in and scattered throughout the high level system models, meaning that these
integrated models can be transformed into implementation models, according to the MDA strategy. 
One of the first and most relevant proposals that integrates security into information systems
through the use of UML is UMLsec (Jürjens, 2002; Jürjens, 2004), which can be employed to
specify and evaluate UML security specifications using formal semantics. The term Model Driven
Security, MDS (Basin et al, 2006) was conceived as a new approach towards building secure
information systems, in which designers specify high-level system models along with their security
properties and use tools to automatically generate system architectures from the models, including
security infrastructures. This proposal extends MDA in three aspects: i) the system models are
enriched with primitives and rules in order to integrate security into the development process, ii) the
model transformation techniques are extended to ensure that these security details are also
transformed, and iii) the system is obtained, including the security properties and the corresponding
security mechanisms. In order to fulfill this goal, the authors consider dialects which provide a
bridge by defining the connection points with which to integrate elements of the security modelling
language with elements of the system design modeling language. Within the context of MDS, the
same authors propose SecureUML, an extension of UML for modelling a generalized role based
access control (Lodderstedt et al, 2002). 
Our proposal uses an access control and audit model specifically designed for DWs to define
security constraints in early stages of the development lifecycle. By using an MDA approach we
consider security issues in all stages of the development process and automatically transform
models at the upper abstraction level into logical models over a relational or multidimensional
approach and finally obtain secure code for DBMS or OLAP tools from these models. 
3. MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE FOR DEVELOPING SECURE DWS 
In this section our Model Driven Architecture for developing secure Data Warehouses is presented.
We focus on the description of the source (Secure Multidimensional PIM) and target (SSAS
Metamodel) models used by the QVT transformations proposed in this work. Figure 1 illustrates
our MDA architecture for developing secure Data Warehouses (Fernández-Medina et al, 2007a). In
this architecture security constraints specified at upper abstraction levels are translated into
conceptual, logical and code levels. 
At the business level we define both functional and non functional requirements for DWs by
using a UML profile for i* called Secure Multidimensional CIM (SMD CIM) (Soler et al, 2008a).
By using a QVT transformation it is possible to obtain a Secure Multidimensional PIM(SMD PIM)
at the conceptual level, represented with our Secure Data Warehouse (SECDW) metamodel
(Fernández-Medina et al, 2007b), which is a UML profile for DWs enriched with an Access Control
and Audit model (Fernández-Medina et al, 2006). This conceptual model will be the source model
for the proposed QVT transformations and will later be explained in more detail.
The specification of a platform-specific model (PSM) is designed according to the specific
properties of the Database Management Systems (DBMS) such as Relational Online Analytical
Processing (ROLAP), Multidimensional Online Analytical Processing (MOLAP) or Hybrid Online
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Analytical Processing (HOLAP). We have defined a Secure Multidimensional PSM (SMD PSM) at
the logical level, which is a ROLAP approach called Secure Relational Data Warehouse
(SECRDW) (Soler et al, 2008b). This metamodel extends the Relational Warehouse Metamodel
(CWM, 2003) with security and audit capabilities and allows us to model STables, SColumn,
PrimaryKey, ForeingKey, etc. The SecurityProperty and SecurityConstraint metaclasses are
associated with the Table and Column metaclasses to allow us to deﬁne security at table and
attribute levels. SecurityConstraints, moreover, permit us to express the constraints (SecurityRule,
AuthoizationRule and AuditRule) that are defined in the SECDW metamodel with UML notes.
At code level we obtain metamodels with secure multidimensional code in the target platform
that can be easily translated into final code. In this work we define several metamodels with which
to represent constraints over a multidimensional approach (MOLAP) in SQL Server Analysis
Services. These metamodels will be the target models for the proposed QVT transformation and will
be presented in more detail in the following sections. 
In order to complete the MDA architecture, it is necessary to define the transformation between
models. The transformation between conceptual and logical levels using SMD PIM (SECDW) and
SMD PSM (SECRDW) has already been defined (Soler et al, 2007). The transformation from our
relational metamodel at the logical level (SECRDW) to secure code in a DBMS using Oracle Label
Security has also been defined. 
Due to the fact that OLAP tools are more frequently used in Data Warehouses than DBMS, our
research effort is focused on developing multidimensional secure code in OLAP tools according to
the above-defined security requirements at conceptual and logical levels. In this paper, we follow
the methodology defined in Blanco et al (2008) to translate security constraints defined at the
conceptual level (SECDW) into secure multidimensional code in SQL Server Analysis Services that
can be automatically translated into final code.
3.1 Secure Multidimensional PIM (SECDW) 
Our Secure Multidimensional PIM, called Secure Data Warehouse (SECDW) (Fernández-Medina
et al, 2007b), allows us to represent the main security requirements for DWs at the conceptual level
and is composed of a UML profile for DWs (Luján-Mora et al, 2006) enriched with an Access
Control and Audit (ACA) model (Fernández-Medina et al, 2006). 
Figure 1: MDA approach for developing secure DWs
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Traditional access control models are based on relational concepts (tables, columns, rows, etc)
and they are not appropriate for the multidimensional modeling used in Data Warehouses. The ACA
model (Fernández-Medina et al, 2006) is an access control and audit model defined for DWs that
allows us to specify security constraints in DW’s multidimensional models. This model considers a
combination of mandatory and role based access control which is based on the classification of
subjects and objects in the system. ACA defines three means of classification: security levels which
indicate the user’s clearance level; security roles which are used by a company to organize users
into a hierarchical role structure according to the responsibilities of each type of work (each user
can play more than one role); and security compartments which are used by an organization to
classify users into a set of horizontal compartments or groups. In the ACA model an authorization
subject is an identity composed of: userID (to identify the user), roleID (one or more user roles),
compartmentID (one or more user compartments), securityLevel (a security level or a level interval)
and subjectExpression (an OCL expression concerning user profiles). 
According to MD models, we can identify the main authorization objects as follows: facts,
dimension, classification, hierarchy levels, measures, dimension attributes and instances. The
authorization object component is composed of two parts: an identity (which may be one of the
following subattributes: class name or attribute name) and an objectExpression in OCL. 
Our ACA model also allows us to define several kinds of security rules: Sensitive information
assignment rules (SIAR) which specify multilevel security policies and allow us to define
sensitivity information for each element in the MD model; Authorization rules (AUR) which
specify the subject to which the rule applies, the object to which the authorization refers, the action
to which the rule refers and the sign describing whether the rule permits or denies access; and
Auditing rules (AR) which help us to ensure that authorized users do not misuse their privileges. 
The SMD PIM metamodel (SECDW) is shown in Figure 2 and includes the main characteristics
of Data Warehouses such as many-to-many relations, degenerated dimensions, multiple
classifications and the alternative path of hierarchies. We have improved this metamodel with
several classes which allow us to represent our security classification in roles, levels and
compartments in order to use them to carry out our transformations (i.e. for each security level we
need to know what the upper and inferior levels are). 
Security aspects can be defined according to our Access Control and Audit model. We can define
security levels (SecurityLevels), user categories (SecurityCompartment), user roles (SecurityRoles)
and security constraints (SConstraints) for each element of the metamodel: SecureFact, Secure -
DegenerateFact, SecureDimension, SecureBase, SecureDegenerateDimension, SecureFact Attribute,
SecureDescriptor, SecureOID and SecureDimensionAttribute. Moreover, there is a UserProfile
metaclass containing information about each user’s right of access to the multidimensional model.
According to our ACA model we can define security rules (SIAR), authorization rules (AUR) and
audit rules (AU) by using OCL expressions and UML notes associated with the corresponding class. 
3.2 Secure Multidimensional Code (SSAS Metamodel) 
The implementation of security measures into OLAP tools has been carried out with SQL Server
Analysis Services (SSAS), which was selected because it works with multidimensional models and
allows us to define security measures over multidimensional elements (cube, dimension, cell). How -
ever, SSAS uses a role-based access control policy (RBAC) that is supposed to translate the measures
defined according to our ACA model (with security roles, levels and compartments) into role approach. 
We have first analysed source code in SSAS and have defined the necessary metamodels which
represent multidimensional secure code with DW’s structure and security measures in a step
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previous to final code which can be automatically obtained from these metamodels. SSAS defines
a DW by using several XML source files. To obtain our SSAS metamodels we focus on roles
configuration, DW structure definition and how security constraints are specified. 
Figure 3 shows the role metamodel used to define roles in SSAS. We will use this metamodel
to define roles in SSAS for each security role, level and compartment defined at the conceptual
level. Figure 4 shows the cube metamodel used to represent a cube in SSAS. We can define
structural aspects for a cube as dimensions, attributes, hierarchies or measures, and security
constraints by using permissions over cubes, dimensions or cells. Finally, Figure 5 shows the
dimension metamodel used to define dimensions and bases in SSAS by using Attributes and
Hierarchies. Security constraints can be established at dimension and cell levels and we can use
complex MDX queries as allowed or denied sets to define advanced security constraints. 
Figure 2: Secure Multidimensional PIM (SECDW)
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Figure3: SSAS Metamodel: Role configuration
Figure 4: SSAS Metamodel: Cube
Figure 5: SSAS Metamodel: Dimension
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4. TRANSFORMATIONS 
In order to obtain secure multidimensional code we follow the methodology previously defined in
Blanco et al (2008). According to our ACA model we are dealing with levels, compartments and
roles but in SSAS we use a role-based policy and in a first step we have to translate this security
information by creating new roles for each possible classification. 
SSAS uses an open policy with specific denials and it is necessary to define what multi -
dimensional elements are hidden for certain roles. It is therefore necessary to analyze the security
rules defined at the conceptual level, to detect the roles involved and to hide certain DW elements
from them. If we wish to hide these elements then we must consider the concepts of security role,
level and compartment. When access is denied to a certain security role this access must also be
denied to its descendants, and when it is denied to a certain security level then access must be denied
to each role that represents a lower security level. 
This paper does not include the structural transformation and is focused on obtaining the secure
multidimensional code corresponding to the security rules defined in our SECDW metamodel at the
conceptual level (see Figure 6). The analysis and the automatic transformation of advanced security
rules (SIAR and AUR) defined in UML notes with OCL expressions will be dealt with in future
works. To define Audit rules in SSAS, administrators can directly establish audit activity on data
including information about when data has been read and modified. These defined rules are
presented in greater detail in the Appendices and are composed of three main transformations (see
Figure 6): SECDW2Role, SECDW2Cube and SECDW2Dimension. SECDW2Role is in charge of
generating the set of models representing the “role files”. After executing SECDW2Role the models
produced contain enough information to easily produce the XML Role files. SECDW2Cube obtains
Cube files from the SECDW model. The Cube files are also a very important part in the DW
description. Thus, the SECDW2Cube transformation tackles the generation of the models
representing these files. This transformation deals, on one hand, with the generation of structure of
the DW, and on the other hand with the inclusion of the aforementioned security issues. Finally,
SECDW2Dimensions is in charge of producing the set of models representing the dimensions of the
DW. Owing to the extent of the transformation, only the security issues have been taken into
account in this paper. 
Although the aforementioned transformations are included in Appendix A, some rules from
these transformations are shown in this section. The following relations are shown in a graphical
manner for a better understanding: 
Figure 6: General view of the proposed transformations
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• SRole2Role relation (see Figure 7): In this relation, each SRole class from the source model is
transformed into a Role class in the target model (that is to say, the Security Configuration
Model).
• createNegativeAttributePermissions relation (see Figure 8): This relation creates the
corresponding negative permissions for all the corresponding levels and roles belonging to each
SecurityProperty. This relation is invoked from the SecureProperty relation process (see
Appendix A.3)
• SRole2CubePermission relation (see Figure 9): For each SRole in each SFact class from the
source model this transformation creates a CubePermission class in the Cube Model. This
relation assumes that the Cube class has been created in the previous execution of another
relation. In this relation the Cube class is updated with the new CubePermission.
5. EXAMPLE
In this section, the defined transformations are applied by using an example of a hospital that wishes
to automate its patient admission process. Figure 10 shows a part of the conceptual model used in
this example which has been defined as an instance of our SECDW metamodel. In this example,
users and objects are classified into security levels (SL) and security roles (SR). The classification
Figure 7: Graphical representation of the SRole2Role relation (SECDW2Role transformation)
Figure 8: Graphical representation of the createNegativeAttributePermissions relation (SECDW2Dimension
transformation)
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within the levels of security is Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), Confidential (C) and Undefined (U), and
the hierarchy of roles can be seen in Figure11.
Several sensitivity information assignment rules (SIARs) have also been defined at class and
attribute levels (see Table 1).
Figure 9: Graphical representation of the SRole2CubePermission relation (SECDW2Cube transformation)
Figure 10: Example SMD PIM Figure 11: Roles hierarchy
Table 1: SIAR defined on the example
SIAR 1
OBJECTS MDCL Admission Patient SECINF SL Secret SR Health Admin    
Tagged values SL and SR of the fact class Admission and the dimension class Patient    
SIAR 2
OBJECTS MDCL Diagnosis SECINF SL Secret SR Health              
Tagged values SL and SR of the dimension class Diagnosis              
SIAR 3
OBJECTS MDCL Admission.cost Patient.address SECINF SR Admin            
Tagged value SR of the attribute cost in the fact class Admission and the attribute address in the dimension
class Patient
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5.2 Cubes 
Next, cubes in the SECDW model are processed by the SECDW2Cube (see Appendix A.2)
transformation by creating an “Admission.cube” file. Structural issues such as cubes, related
dimensions and their attributes, and measures, are defined. 
The XML files which resulted from applying the proposed transformation to the example are
shown in the following sections. We usually obtain the same code fragments (for each dimension,
attribute, etc) but, due to space constraints, we have only included the first repetitive code fragment
and we have indicated that this fragment must be repeated for certain elements (each security role,
level, dimension, attribute, etc).
5.1 Security configuration 
Firstly, security configuration is obtained for the SECDW2Role (see Appendix A.1) transformation
creating a new role (a new XML file with “.role” extension) for each security role, level and
compartment defined in the SECDW model. This is the “SRHospitalEmployee.role” file generated
for security role “HospitalEmployee”: 
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We shall now show the results obtained by applying transformations which deal with the security
measures defined in the cubes. SIAR 1 defines security constraints over the “Admission” fact class,
and a code fragment with a cube permission is generated for each authorized role. A cube permission
for an authorized role (SLS) which represents a security level of “Secret” it is shown below. 
Cube permissions are also defined for the remaining authorized roles: for security levels >=
“Secret” (SLS and SLTS), security roles = “Health” and its descendants (SRHealth, SRDoctor and
SRNurse) and security roles = “Admin” and its descendants (SRAdmin). 
SIAR 3 defines that the attribute “cost” can only be accessed by security role “Admin”. 
We include a cell permission for the security role “Admin” and its descendants: 
5.3 Dimensions 
Finally, classes which define dimensions and bases in SECDW model are processed by the
SECDW2Dimension (see Appendix A.3) transformation to obtain their structural and security
issues. An XML file with “dim” extension is created for each dimension. For the “Patient”
dimension class we obtain: 
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We shall now show the results obtained from applying transformations which deal with the
security measures defined in the cubes. SIAR 1 defines security constraints over “Admission” fact
class, and a code fragment with a cube permission is generated for each authorized role. A cube
permission for an authorized role (SLS) which represents a security level of “Secret” it is shown
below. 
SIAR 1 establishes that the “Patient” dimension class can only be accessed by users with a
security role of “Health” or “Admin” and a security level of “Secret”. A dimension permission is
defined for each authorized role, that is, for security levels >= “Secret”, and security roles =
“Health” or “Admin” and their descendants. This is an example of a dimension permission for the
SLS (Security Level Secret) role: 
A specific denied set is defined for each unauthorized role, that is, roles with SL < S and SR
which are distinct from Health, Admin and their descendants. 
An SIAR 3 security rule has been set up at the attribute level which denies accesses to “address”
attribute if the security role is distinct from “Admin”. For each role with an SR which is distinct
from “Admin” and its descendants: 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have accomplished an important step towards completing our MDA architecture for developing
secure Data Warehouses with the automatic generation of secure multidimensional code in a
specific OLAP tool, SQL Server Analysis Services, by using QVT transformations. 
In a previous work we obtained secure code for Oracle Label Security from a relational PSM
metamodel, but we used a relational approach in a DBMS. OLAP tools are more frequently used in
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Data Warehouses than DBMS, so we have therefore focused our research effort on OLAP tools and
multidimensional approaches. 
Therefore, in this work we use the multidimensional capabilities of SSAS to translate the
security measures defined in our secure multidimensional model at conceptual level into secure
multidimensional code for SSAS. We obtain code with the role configuration of our system, the
structural definition of the DW and the main part of the security measures defined at upper levels.
The final code adds other elements which can be easily obtained from our multidimensional secure
code with an automatic transformation. 
We furthermore realize that OLAP tools do not support the complete security requirements
definition over the multidimensional model at upper abstraction levels and deal with partial security
establishment. SSAS only uses RBAC as an access control policy and our security model is richer than
the security capabilities that SSAS offers. We have adapted our security information to a role-based
approach and we have hidden multidimensional elements for certain roles to represent security rules.
Moreover, we cannot represent security constraints on OLAP operations at upper abstraction levels
which allow users to restrict access to unauthorized information by using navigations or inferences.
Our MDA architecture for developing secure DWs allows us to define security requirements but
should be extended with the possibility of establishing navigation and inference constraints which
may be translated into OLAP code. Tools should similarly be extended to give us control over
navigations and inferences which may discover unauthorized business information. 
As a future work, we will define the remainder of the QVT transformations in order to obtain
secure multidimensional code in SSAS from conceptual models. We will extend this work by
presenting the structural transformations that were not included due to space constraints. We will
analyze the advanced security rules defined with OCL expressions and we will create the
corresponding QVT transformations to complete our secure code. Finally, we will also extend this
complete approach to obtain secure multidimensional code in other OLAP tools such as Pentaho. 
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX – QVT TRANSFORMATIONS: SECDW2ROLE, SECDW2CUBE AND SECDW2DIMENSION 
In this Appendix the QVT transformations defined to obtain secure multidimensional code from
conceptual models defined according to our SECDW metamodel are presented focusing on security
rules. The proposed transformations are divided into several relations, each of them is in charge of
transforming elements from the source model into elements of the target model. It is possible to
distinguish between two kinds of relations: relations and top relations. Top relations are mandatory
and must always be held by both the source and target models. On the opposite, simple relations
and only executed when other relations invokes them. Thus, top relation could be considered as a
“main” function or method. 
APPENDIX A.1: SECDW2ROLE –
GENERATION OF ROLE SECURITY ISSUES FROM DW SECURE SPECIFICATION 
In this section, the transformation SECDW2Role is presented. This transformation is in charge of
transforming all the aspects related to the roles included in the SECDW model (see Figure 2).
Following the relations that made up the SECDW2Role transformation, an instance of the Role
metamodel (see Figure 3) is created. 
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APPENDIX A.2: SECDW2CUBE –
GENERATION OF CUBE SECURITY ISSUES FROM DW SECURE SPECIFICATION 
Next, the transformation SECDW2Cube is presented. This transformation implements all the rules
read the SECDW model (see Figure 2) and generate all the required security issues related with DW
Cubes (that is to say, CubePermissions and CellPermissions from the elements of the Fact Class of
the SECDW model). Figure 4 shows the target metamodel. 
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APPENDIX A.3: SECDW2DIMENSION –
GENERATION OF DIMENSION SECURITY ISSUES FROM DW SECURE SPECIFICATION 
Finally, this section presents the transformation SECDW2Dimension. After executing the previous
transformations, this one generates the security information to generate the source code for the third
security file (see Figure 6). Using the SECDW metamodel (see Figure 2) as source metamodel, the
security information is generated in terms of a model according to the metamodel shown in the Figure 5. 
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